

### **GOVERNMENT OF BERMUDA Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform**

Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform Headquarters

#### AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory 3/2021: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing controls in higher risk jurisdictions

#### **Requirement to apply Enhanced Due Diligence for higher risk jurisdictions**

Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform, Hon. Kathy Lynn Simmons, JP, MP today issued AML-ATF Advisory 3/2021 about the risks in a number of jurisdictions arising from inadequate systems and controls to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 (POCA Regulations) require the Bermuda regulated sector and relevant persons to apply enhanced customer due diligence to high-risk countries.

- Regulation 11 (1)(aa) of the Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008, requires that a relevant person must apply on a risksensitive basis enhanced customer due diligence measures to business relationships with customers in instances where a person or a transaction is from or in a country that has been identified as having a higher risk by the Financial Action Task Force or the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; and
- Regulation 11 (1)(ab) requires a relevant person to apply, on a risk-sensitive basis, enhanced customer due diligence in instances where a person or transaction is from or in a country which represents a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, terrorist financing or being subject to international sanctions.

As the international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standard-setter, FATF regularly publishes statements that identify high-risk countries based on assessments of their AML/CFT regimes. In accordance with Regulation 11 (1)(aa), the Minister for Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform would like to draw the regulated sector's and relevant persons' attention to the latest FATF publication on high risk jurisdictions.

#### FATF Public Statement

On 21 October, 2021 FATF published two statements identifying jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes. These statements are included at Annexes A and B.

In response to the latest FATF statements, the Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform advises the regulated sector and relevant persons to consider the following:

Minister of Legal	Consider as a high risk and <b>apply</b>	Take appropriate actions to
Affairs and	counter measures and enhanced	minimise the associated risks,
Constitutional	due diligence measures in	which may include enhanced due
<b>Reform Advice:</b>	accordance with the risks	diligence measures in high risk
		situations
Jurisdictions:	Democratic People's Republic of	Albania
Jui isuictions:	Korea* (DPRK)	Barbados
	Kolea (DI KK)	Burkina Faso
	Iran*	Cambodia
	lian	Cayman Islands
		Haiti
		Jamaica
		Jordan
		Malta
		Mali
		Morocco
		Myanmar*
		Nicaragua*
		Pakistan
		Panama
		Philippines
		Senegal
		South Sudan*
		Syria*
		Turkey
		Uganda
		Yemen*
		Zimbabwe*

To ensure that an appropriate determination of the risks relating to these jurisdictions can be carried out, it is important that the annexed statements are read in their entirety. All financial institutions and relevant persons, in the implementation of their systems and controls to combat financial crime, should give consideration to the FATF assessments and take appropriate actions in light of the associated risks.

\*These jurisdictions are subject to sanctions measures at the time of publication of this notice which require firms to take additional measures, in accordance with the International Sanctions Regulations 2013. Details can be found here:

https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/International-Sanctions-Regulations-2013-v2.pdf

Please see the following links for more information about international sanctions: <u>https://www.gov.bm/international-sanctions-measures</u> and

https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases

#### **Background Information**

- 1. This Advisory replaces all previous advisory notices issued by the Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Reform on this subject.
- 2. The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989 and today its members include 35 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations (the European Commission and the Gulf Co-Operation Council).
- 3. The Bermuda Government's strategy is to use financial tools to deter crime and terrorism; detect it when it happens; and disrupt those responsible and hold them accountable for their actions. The FATF is central to Bermuda's international objectives within this strategy.
- 4. The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 require the regulated sector and relevant persons to put in place policies and procedures in order to prevent activities related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The regulated sector and relevant persons are also required to apply enhanced customer due diligence and enhanced ongoing monitoring on a risk-sensitive basis in certain defined situations and in "any other situation, which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing".
- 5. This Advisory applies to all entities and persons subject to the POCA Regulations as provided for in Regulation 4, namely:
  - a. AML/AFT regulated financial institutions;
  - b. independent professionals;
  - c. casino operators;
  - d. dealers in high value goods, who are registered with the FIA; and
  - e. real estate brokers and real estate agents.

Therefore, these sectors shall comply with the above AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory.

6. A large number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF, thus the jurisdictions included in the FATF public statement and 'ongoing compliance' document are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of jurisdictions that should be considered by relevant persons to present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

#### Annex A: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action<sup>1</sup> – 21 October2021

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the "black list". Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for countries in the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action, given that they are already subject to the FATF's call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's AML/CFT regimes, the FATF's call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect.

• <u>High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This statement was previously called "Public Statement".

#### Annex B: Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring <sup>2</sup> – 21 October 2021

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the "grey list".

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has provided some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since June 2021: Albania, Barbados, Botswana, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Burkina Faso, Haiti, and South Sudan were given the opportunity and chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued in February and June 2021 for these jurisdictions are included below, but they may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Jordan, Mali, and Turkey.

The FATF welcomes the progress made by these countries in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, despite the challenges posed by COVID-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This statement was previously called "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process".

Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies	Jurisdiction no longer subject to increased monitoring
Albania	Botswana
Barbados	<u>Mauritius</u>
Burkina Faso	
<u>Cambodia</u>	
<u>Cayman Islands</u>	
<u>Haiti</u>	
<u>Jamaica</u>	
Jordan	
<u>Mali</u>	
<u>Malta</u>	
Morocco	
<u>Myanmar</u>	
<u>Nicaragua</u>	
<u>Pakistan</u>	
Panama	
Philippines	
<u>Senegal</u>	
South Sudan	
<u>Syria</u>	
<u>Turkey</u>	
<u>Uganda</u>	
<u>Yemen</u>	
Zimbabwe	

## Albania

Since February 2020, when Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Albania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing a long-term project to reduce the informal economy and use of cash through establishing electronic invoicing for business-to-government, business-to-business, and business-to-customer transactions. Albania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) finalising the registration of real estate properties in Albania; (2) establishing more effective mechanisms to detect and prevent criminals from owning or controlling DNFBPs, including by passing a law on the licensing and regulation of real estate intermediaries; (3) ensuring that there are effective mechanisms for timely access by authorities to beneficial ownership information about companies as well as appropriate penalties for non-compliance or the provision of false information; (4) increasing the number of prosecutions for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offences; and (5) demonstrating the continued use of asset seizures and securing final confiscations for the proceeds of crime, especially assets linked to third-party and professional money launderers, as well as indirect proceeds and equivalent value.

Since February 2020, when Barbados made a high-level political **Barbados** commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Barbados has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by applying risk based supervision and sanctions on FIs and TCSPs. Barbados should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an effective application of risk-based supervision DNFBPs; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-todate basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (3) ensure its FIU's financial information products further assist law enforcement authorities in investigating ML or TF; (4) demonstrating that ML investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country's risk profile and result in sanctions, when appropriate, and reducing the backlog in completing cases; (5) further pursuing confiscation in ML cases, including by seeking assistance from foreign counterparts.

#### In February 2021, Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the (Statement from February effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2019, Burkina Faso has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by adopting a national AML/CFT strategy in December 2020. Burkina Faso will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) adopting and implementing follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions in the national strategy; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) strengthening of resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) increasing the diversity of STR reporting; (6) enhancing FIU's human resources through additional hiring, training and budget; (7) conduct training for LEAs, prosecutors and other relevant authorities; (8) demonstrating that authorities are pursuing confiscation as a policy objective; (9) enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in combatting TF, in line with the TF National Strategy; and (10) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as riskbased monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

Cambodia

**Burkina** Faso

2021)

Since February 2019, when Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the

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effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Cambodia has taken some steps toward improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating sanctions being applied to FIs for AML/CFT breaches. However, Cambodia should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Cambodia should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing disseminations of financial intelligence to law enforcement authorities in connection with highrisk crimes; (2) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (3) demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value; (4) demonstrate that implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) related to PF is occurring by providing training to strengthen the skills of competent authorities to implement PF TFS, and enhance the understanding of sanctions evasion.

The FATF expresses concern that Cambodia failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Cambodia to swiftly complete its action plan by February 2022. Otherwise, the FATF will decide the next step at that time for insufficient progress.

The Cayman Islands In February 2021, the Cayman Islands made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Cayman Islands should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) imposing adequate and effective sanctions in cases where relevant parties (including legal persons) do not file accurate, adequate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information in line with those requirements; and (2) demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering cases in line with the jurisdiction's risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions.

> In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Haiti will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts; (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in its legal and regulatory framework that impede the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (4) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (5) ensuring a better use of financial intelligence and other relevant information by competent authorities for combatting ML

# Haiti

(Statement from June 2021)

and TF; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its ML offence and demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (7) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in its TF offence and targeted financial sanctions regime; (9) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

Jamaica

Jordan

Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risks. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate, risk- based supervision in all sectors; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (3) taking proper measures to increase the use of financial intelligence and to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country's risk profile; and (4) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

In October 2021, Jordan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2019, Jordan has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by finalising their National Risk Assessment (NRA). Jordan will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing and disseminating the ML/TF risk assessments of NPOs, legal persons and virtual assets; (2) improving risk based supervision and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting training and awareness raising programmes for DNFBPs on their AML/CFT obligations, particularly with regard to filing and submitting STRs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons and legal arrangements; (5) pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions, including through parallel financial investigations, for predicate offences in line with the risk identified in the NRA; (6) creating a legal obligation for confiscating instrumentalities used or intended to be used in ML crimes; (7) developing and implementing a legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions; and (8) developing and implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

# Mali

In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2019, Mali has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by adopting its National Risk Assessment (NRA). Mali will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) disseminating the results of the NRA to all relevant stakeholders including by conducting awareness raising activities with the highest risk sectors; (2) developing and starting to implement a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) ensuring relevant competent authorities are involved in investigation and prosecution of ML; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) establishing a legal framework and procedures to implement targeted financial sanctions; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

In June 2021, Malta made a high-level political commitment to work Malta with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Malta should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) continuing to demonstrate that beneficial ownership information is accurate and that, where appropriate, effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, commensurate with the ML/TF risks, are applied to legal persons if information provided is found to be inaccurate; and ensuring that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are applied to gatekeepers when they do not comply with their obligations to obtain accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (2) enhancing the use of the FIU's financial intelligence to support authorities pursuing criminal tax and related money laundering cases, including by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Commissioner for Revenue and the FIU; and (3) increasing the focus of the FIU's analysis on these types of offences, to produce intelligence that helps Maltese law enforcement detect and investigate cases in line with Malta's identified ML risks related to tax evasion.

Morocco In February 2021, Morocco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Morocco has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by providing FIU with financial and human resources to enhance analytical capabilities in order to fulfil its core mandate of operational and strategic analysis. Morocco should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic

deficiencies, including by: (1) improving risk-based supervision and taking remedial actions and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) ensuring that beneficial ownership information, including information of legal persons and foreign legal arrangements is adequate, accurate and verified; (3) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (4) prioritising the identification, investigation and prosecution of all types of ML in accordance with the country's risk profile; and (5) monitoring and effectively supervising the compliance of FIs and DNFBPs with targeted financial sanctions obligations.

Since, February 2020, when Myanmar made a high-level political Myanmar commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Myanmar has taken some steps toward improving its AML/CFT regime by communicating updates to the targeted financial sanctions lists to the private sector on a timely basis. Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to PF, including training on sanctions evasion.

> The FATF notes Myanmar's limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines having now expired, and significant work remains. The FATF strongly urges Myanmar to swiftly complete its full action plan and address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

**Nicaragua** In February 2020, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Nicaragua has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by disseminating the outcomes of its ML/TF risk assessment, strengthening its AML/CFT international cooperation and by improving risk-based supervision and its framework for sanctioning reporting entities for violations of STR obligations. Nicaragua should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes.

# Pakistan

Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan's continued political commitment has led to significant progress across a comprehensive CFT action plan. Pakistan has completed 26 of the 27 action items in its 2018 action plan. While Pakistan has reported some steps, the FATF encourages Pakistan to continue to make progress to address as soon as possible, the one remaining CFT-related item by continuing to demonstrate that TF investigations and prosecutions target senior leaders and commanders of UN designated terrorist groups.

In response to additional deficiencies later identified in Pakistan's 2019 APG Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), in June 2021, Pakistan provided further high-level commitment to address these strategic deficiencies pursuant to a new action plan that primarily focuses on combating money laundering. Since June 2021, Pakistan has taken swift steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting legislative amendments to enhance its international cooperation framework; demonstrating DNFBP monitoring for PF TFS and DNFBP supervision commensurate with the risks; and applying sanctions for non-compliance with beneficial ownership requirements. Pakistan should continue to work to address its other strategically important AML/CFT deficiencies, namely by: (1) providing evidence that it actively seeks to enhance the impact of sanctions beyond its jurisdiction by nominating additional individuals and entities for designation at the UN; and (2) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions and that proceeds of crime continue to be restrained and confiscated in line with Pakistan's risk profile, including working with foreign counterparts to trace, freeze, and confiscate assets.

### Panama

In June 2019, Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Panama has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by applying risk-based supervision of the DNFBP sector and increasing parallel investigations into the predicate crime and money laundering offense. However, Panama should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Panama should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its understanding of the ML/TF risk of legal persons, as part of the corporate sector and informing findings to its national policies to mitigate the identified risks; (2) ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions again AML/CFT violations; (3) ensuring adequate verification, of upto-date beneficial ownership information by obliged entities and timely access by competent authorities, establishing an effective mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors; and (4) demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and continuing to provide constructive and timely international cooperation for such offences, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas.

The FATF expresses concern with the pace of progress and Panama's failure to complete its action plan items which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Panama to swiftly complete its action plan by February 2022. Otherwise, the FATF will decide the next step at that time for insufficient progress.

Since June 2021, when the Philippines made a high-level political Philippines commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Philippines has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, by developing and implementing guidance on delistings and the unfreezing of assets for targeted financial sanctions related to PF. The Philippines should work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTS and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF.

Since February 2021, Senegal made a high-level political commitment Senegal

to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks (in particular related to the DNFBP sector) across relevant authorities through training and outreach; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) ensuring that Financial Institutions and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective supervision; (4) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) continuing to enhance the FIU's human resources to ensure that it maintains effective operational analysis Page 13 of 18 capacities; (6) demonstrating that efforts aimed at strengthening detection mechanisms and reinforcing the capability to conduct ML/predicate offences investigations and prosecutions activities are sustained consistently in line with the Senegal's risk profile; (7) establishing comprehensive and standardised policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with its risk profile; (8) strengthening the authorities understanding of TF risks and enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in TF in line with the 2019 TF National Strategy; and (9) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. South Sudan will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) applying and engaging with ESAAMLG for membership and committing to undergo a mutual evaluation by ESAAMLG or other assessment body; (2) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (3) designating an authority/authorities in charge of coordinating the national ML/TF risks assessments; (4) becoming a party to and implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (5) competent authorities should be suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (6) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (7) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (8) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and proliferation financing; and (9) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.

Syria Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to

South Sudan

(Statement from June 2021)

monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

# **Turkey** In October 2021, Turkey made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in October 2019, Turkey has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by: promulgating an overarching national strategy for authorities in charge of combatting ML and TF; establishing a beneficial ownership registry; developing the strategic analysis capacity within the FIU; increasing the level of seizures of smuggled cash across borders; revising sentences available for terrorist financing to ensure there is an incentive for law enforcement to investigate TF activity independently and alongside terrorism offences; and eliminating the delays in implementing targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing.

Turkey will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) dedicating more resources at the FIU to supervision of AML/CFT compliance by high-risk sectors and increasing on-site inspections overall; (2) applying dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, in particular for unregistered money transfer services and exchange offices and in relation to the requirements of adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations and increasing proactive disseminations by the FIU; (4) undertaking more complex money laundering investigations and prosecutions; (5) setting out clear responsibilities and measurable performance objectives and metrics for the authorities responsible for recovering criminal assets and pursuing terrorism financing cases and using statistics to update risk assessments and inform policy; (6) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support networks; (7) concerning targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs 1373 and 1267, pursuing outgoing requests and domestic designations related to UN-designated groups, in line with Turkey's risk profile; (8) to fully implement a risk-based approach to supervision of non-profit organisations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, conducting outreach to a broad range of NPOs in the sector and engaging with their feedback, ensuring that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations, and taking steps to ensure that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity, such as fundraising.

The FATF continues to monitor Turkey's oversight of the NPO sector. Turkey is urged to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards.

# Uganda

In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Uganda should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) seeking international cooperation in line with the country's risk profile; (2) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; (4) demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks; (5) establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (6) demonstrating that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions commensurate with Uganda's TF risk profile; and (7) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF-related targeted financial sanctions and implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent TF abuse. The FATF continues to monitor Uganda's oversight of the NPO sector. Uganda is urged to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards.

# Yemen

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

**Zimbabwe** In October 2019, Zimbabwe made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2021 plenary, the FATF has made the initial determination that Zimbabwe has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of Zimbabwe's AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Zimbabwe has

made the following key reforms, including by: (1) developing riskbased supervision framework for FIs and DNFBPs including through capacity building among the supervisory authority; (2) developing adequate risk mitigation measures among FIs and DNFBPs, including by applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to breaches; (3) creating mechanisms to ensure that competent authorities have access to timely and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; and (4) addressing remaining gaps in the PF-related targeted financial sanctions framework. The FATF will continue to monitor the COVID-19 situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

# Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

# **Botswana** The FATF welcomes Botswana's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Botswana has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2018. Botswana is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process. Botswana will continue to work with ESAAMLG to improve further its AML/CFT system.

# **Mauritius** The FATF welcomes Mauritius's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Mauritius has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2020. Mauritius is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process. Mauritius will continue to work with ESAAMLG to improve further its AML/CFT system.

\* This statement was previously called "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process"